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We present a memory-based snowdrift game (MBSG) taking place on networks. We found that, when a
lattice is taken to be the underlying structure, the transition of spatial patterns at some critical values of the
payoff parameter is observable for both 4 and 8-neighbor lattices. The transition points as well as the styles
of spatial patterns can be explained by local stability analysis. In sharp contrast to previously reported results,
cooperation is promoted by the spatial structure in the MBSG. Interestingly, we found that the frequency of
cooperation of the MBSG on a scale-free network peaks at a specific value of the payoff parameter. This
phenomenon indicates that properly encouraging selfish behaviors can optimally enhance the cooperation. The
memory effects of individuals are discussed in detail and some non-monotonous phenomena are observed on
both lattices and scale-free networks. Our work may shed some new light on the study of evolutionary games
over networks.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 89.65.-s, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory has been considered an impor-
tant approach to characterizing and understanding the emer-
gence of cooperative behavior in systems consisting of selfish
individuals [1]. Such systems are ubiquitous in nature, rang-
ing from biological to economic and social systems. Since the
groundwork on repeated games by Axelrod [2], the evolution-
ary prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) as a general metaphor for
studying the cooperative behavior has drawn much attention
from scientific communities. Due to the difficulties in assess-
ing proper payoffs, the PDG has some restriction in discussing
the emergence of cooperative behavior. Thus, the proposal of
the snowdrift game (SG) was generated to be an alternative to
the PDG. The SG, equivalent to the hawk-dove game, is also
of biological interest [3]. However, in these two games, the
unstable cooperative behavior is contrary to the empirical ev-
idence. This disagreement motivates a number of extensions
of the original games to provide better explanations for the
emergence of cooperation [2, 4].
The spatial game, introduced by Nowak and May [5], is a
typical extension, which can result in emergence and persis-
tence of cooperation in the PDG. Motivated by the idea of the
spatial game, many interests have been given to the effects of
spatial structures, such as lattices [6] and networks [8], on co-
operative behavior. In a recent paper [9], Hauert and Doebeli
found that compared to the PDG, cooperation is inhibited by
the spatial structure. The surprising finding is in sharp contrast
to one’s intuition, since in comparison with the PDG, the SG
favors cooperation. More recently, Santos and Pacheco [10]
discovered that scale-free networks provide a unified frame-
work for the emergence of cooperation. Besides, Szabo´ et
al. [11] presented a stochastic evolutionary rule to capture the
bounded rationality of individuals for better characterizing the
dynamics of games in real systems.
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Among the previous work, the effects of individuals’ mem-
ory have not received much attention in the study of evolu-
tionary games on networks. We argue that individuals usu-
ally make decisions based on the knowledge of past records
in nature and society, and the historical memory would play
a key role in an evolutionary game. Therefore, in the present
work, we propose a memory-based snowdrift game (MBSG),
in which players update their strategies based on their past ex-
perience. Our work is partially inspired by Challet and Zhang
[12], who presented a so-called minority game, in which
agents make decisions exclusively according to the common
information stored in their memories. It is found that finite
memories of agents have crucial effects on the dynamics of
the minority game [13]. We focus on the evolutionary SG for
its general representation of many social and biological sce-
narios. The MBSG on different network structures, including
lattices and scale-free networks, is studied. Transitions of spa-
tial patterns with relevant sudden decreases of the frequencies
of cooperation are observed in lattices. Local stability analy-
ses are provided for explaining such phenomena. In a scale-
free network, cooperation level peaks at a specific value of
payoff parameter, which is different from previously reported
results. For both lattices and scale-free networks, we found
that memory effects play different roles on the frequency of
cooperation for distinct ranges of the payoff parameter.
II. THE MODEL
We first briefly describe the original SG model. Imagine
that two cars are trapped on either side of a huge snowdrift.
Both drivers can either get out of the car to shovel (cooperate-
C) or stay in the car (defect-D) in any one negotiation. If they
both choose C, then they both gain benefit b of getting back
home while sharing labor c of shovelling, i.e., both get payoff
b − c/2. If both drivers choose D, they will still be trapped
by the snowdrift and get nothing. If one shovels (C) while the
other one stays in the car (D), then they both can get home
but the defector pays no labor cost and gets a perfect payoff
2b, while the cooperator gets b − c. Without losing generality,
b− c/2 is usually set to be 1 so that the evolutionary behavior
of the SG can be investigated with a single parameter, r =
c/2 = c/(2b− c). Thus, one has a rescaled payoff matrix
C D
C 1 1− r
D 1 + r 0
where 0 < r < 1. Though, compared with the PDG, the
payoff rank of the SG favors the emergence of cooperation,
cooperation is still unstable, which results from the highest
payoff of defectors.
Here, we introduce the rules of the evolutionary MBSG.
Consider that N players are placed on the nodes of a certain
network. In every round, all pairs of connected players play
the game simultaneously. The total payoff of each player is
the sum over all its encounters. After a round is over, each
player will have the strategy information (C or D) of its neigh-
bors. Subsequently, each player knows its best strategy in that
round by means of self-questioning, i.e., each player adopts
its anti-strategy to play a virtual game with all its neighbors,
and calculates the virtual total payoff. Comparing the virtual
payoff with the actual payoff, each player can get its optimal
strategy corresponding to the highest payoff and then record
it into its memory. Taking into account the bounded rational-
ity of players, we assume that players are quite limited in their
analyzing power and can only retain the last M bits of the past
strategy information. At the start of the next generation, the
probability of making a decision (choosing C or D) for each
player depends on the ratio of the numbers of C and D stored
in its memory, i.e., PC = NCNC+ND =
NC
M
and PD = 1 − PC ,
where NC and ND are the numbers of C and D, respectively.
Then, all players update their memories simultaneously. Re-
peat the above process and the system evolves.
III. MBSG ON LATTICES
The key quantity for characterizing the cooperative behav-
ior is the frequency of cooperation, fC , which is defined as the
fraction of C in the whole population. fC can be obtained by
counting the number of cooperators in the whole population
after the system reaches a steady state, at which the number of
cooperators shows slight fluctuations around an average value.
Hence, fC is the ratio of the cooperator number and the total
number of individuals N . One can easily see that fC ranges
from 0 to 1, where 0 and 1 correspond to cases of no coop-
erators and entire cooperator state. Firstly, we investigate the
MBSG on two-dimensional square lattices of four and eight
neighbors with periodic boundary conditions. Simulations are
carried out for a population of N = 10000 individuals located
on nodes. Initially, the strategies of C and D are uniformly
distributed among all players. The memory information of
each player is randomly assigned, and we have checked that
this assignment has no contributions to the stable behavior of
the system. Each data point is obtained by averaging over 40
different initial states. Figures 1 (a) and (b) show fC as a
function of the parameter r on the lattices of four and eight
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FIG. 1: (Color online). The frequency of cooperation fC as a func-
tion of the payoff parameter r for two-dimensional (a) 4-neighbor
and (b) 8-neighbor lattices, respectively. (△), (©) and () are for
M = 2, 7 and 30, respectively. Each data point is obtained by av-
eraging over 40 different initial states and fC for each simulation is
obtained by averaging from MC time step t = 5000 to t = 10000,
where the system has reached a steady state. The top inset of (a) is
fC as a function of memory length M for 2 different cooperation
levels. The bottom inset of (a) is a time series of fC for r = 0.4 in
the case of M = 1. Since for M = 1, fC as a function of t displays
a big oscillation, we do not compute the fC over a period of MC time
steps. The inset of (b) is fC depending on M for 4 cooperation levels
in the range of 0 < r < 0.5. The network size is N = 10000.
neighbors, respectively. In these two figures, four common
features should be noted: (i) fC has a step structure, and the
number of steps corresponds to the number of neighbors on
the lattice, i.e., 4 steps for the 4-neighbor lattice and 8 steps for
the 8-neighbor lattice; (ii) the two figures have 180◦-rotational
symmetry about the point (0.5, 0.5); (iii) the memory length
M has no influences on the dividing point rc between any two
cooperation levels, but has strong effects on the value of fC in
each level; (iv) for a large payoff parameter r, the system still
behaves in a high cooperation level, contrary to the results
reported in [9]. It indicates that although selfish individuals
make decisions based on the best choices stored in their mem-
ories to maximize their own benefits, the cooperative behavior
can emerge in the population in spite of the highest payoff of
D.
The effects of memory length M on fC in the 4-neighbor
lattice are shown in the insets of Fig. 1. Since fC is indepen-
dent of r within each cooperation level, we simply choose a
value of r in each level to investigate the influence of M on
fC . Moreover, due to the inverse symmetry of fC about the
point (0.5, 0.5), we concentrate on the range of 0 < r < 0.5.
The top inset of Fig. 1 (a) reports fC as a function of M for
the ranges of 0 < r < 0.25 and 0.25 < r < 0.5. One can find
that fC is a monotonous function of M for both levels and the
decreasing velocity of fC in the 1st level is faster than that in
the 2nd one. In contrast, in the 8-neighbor lattice, fC exhibits
some non-monotonous behaviors as M increases. As shown
in the bottom inset of Fig. 1 (b), there exists a minimum fC
3FIG. 2: Typical spatial patterns in two distinct payoff parameter
ranges: (a) 0 < r < 0.25, (b) 0.25 < r < 0.5. The C is in black
and the D is in white. A 50× 50 portion of the full 100× 100 lattice
with 4 neighbors is illustrated. (c) and (d) are the relevant stable lo-
cal patterns of (a) and (b). WC and WD are the payoffs of the center
individual A by choosing C and D with fixing strategies of neighbors
for each local pattern. r = 0.25 in (c) and 0.5 in (d).
in the 1st level corresponding to M = 23, and fC is an in-
creasing function of M in the 2nd level. A maximum value of
fC exists in the 3rd and 4th levels when M is chosen to be 5,
as shown in the top inset of Fig. 1 (b). Thus, memory length
M plays a very complex role in fC reflected by the remark-
ably different behaviors in 4 cooperation levels. It is worth to
point out that in case of M = 1, the evolutionary behavior
of the system sharply differs from that of M > 1, since each
individual will definitely adopt the exclusive strategy stored
in its memory to play the game at the next time step. A typ-
ical example with M = 1 for two types of lattices is shown
in the bottom inset of Fig. 1 (a). A big oscillation of fC is
observed. The unstable behavior will be explained in terms of
the evolution of spatial patterns later.
We give a heuristic analysis of local stability for the divid-
ing points rc of different levels. At each critical point rc be-
tween any two levels, the payoff of an individual with strat-
egy C should equal that of the individual with D. We assume
the number of C neighbors of a given node to be m, thus
in the K-neighbor lattice, the quantity of defector neighbor
is K − m. Accordingly, we get the local stability equation:
m + (K − m)(1 − rc) = (1 + rc)m, where the left side is
the payoff of the given individual with C, and the right side
is the payoff of the individual with D. This equation results
in rc = (K − m)/K . Considering all of the possible values
of m in the 4-neighbor lattice, the values of rc are 0.25, 0.5
and 0.75, respectively. Similarly, the dividing points of the 8-
neighbor lattice are obtained as 1/8, 2/8, · · · , 7/8. As shown
FIG. 3: (Color online). Typical spatial patterns in two distinct payoff
parameter ranges: (a) 0.25 < r < 0.375; (b) 0.375 < r < 0.5. The
color coding is the same as Fig. 2. A 50 × 50 portion of the full
100× 100 lattice with 8 neighbors is illustrated.
in Figs. 1 (a) and (b), the simulation results are in good ac-
cordance with the analytical predictions. Moreover, it should
be noted that there exists a sharp decrease of fC at rc, which
implies the sudden transformation of the evolutionary pattern
of the system.
To gain some intuitionistic insights into the evolution of the
system, we investigate the spatial patterns for different r on
lattices. Figure 2 illustrates typical patterns of two coopera-
tion levels on the 4-neighbor lattice. The patterns are statis-
tically static, independent of initial states. Figure 2 (a), for
0 < r < 0.25, is a typical spatial pattern of ‘C lines’ against
a background of ‘chessboard’ form, i.e., a site is surrounded
by anti-strategy neighbors. Figure 2 (b) is for the range of
0.25 < r < 0.5. In contrast to Fig. 2 (a), ‘C lines’ are broken
in some places by D sites, and some flower-like local patterns
are observed. The patterns in the ranges of 0.5 < r < 0.75
and 0.75 < r < 1 are the patterns of Figs. 2 (b) and (a) with C
and D site exchanged, respectively, which are not shown here.
Therefore, there exist four kinds of spatial patterns with typ-
ical features corresponding to four levels of fC . The pattern
formation can be explained in terms of steady local patterns.
In Fig. 2 (c), we show the steady local patterns existing in the
1st cooperation level. From the payoff ratio by choosing C
and D of individual A, i.e., WC : WD, the 3rd local pattern is
the most stable one with the highest payoff ratio. In parallel,
the 4th local pattern is the counterpart of the 3nd one, so that
it is also very stable. Hence, the pattern in Fig. 2 (a) has a
chessboard-like background together with C lines composed
of the 1st and 2nd local patterns. Similarly, the chessboard-
like background in Fig. 2 (b) is also attributed to the strongest
stability of the 4th and 5th local patterns, and the probabil-
ity of the occurrence of other local patterns is correlated with
their payoff ratios. Whereafter, we study the spatial patterns
on the 8-neighbor lattice. In Fig. 3, we figured out that each
4FIG. 4: (Color online). Typical patterns for the time step t = 8001
and t = 8002 in the case of memory length M = 1, r = 0.4. The
C is in black and the D is in white. A 50 × 50 portion of the full
100× 100 lattice with 4 neighbors is illustrated.
cooperation level exhibits a unique pattern and the difference
between the patterns of r < 0.5 and r > 0.5 is the exchange
of C and D sites. For the 1st and 2nd levels, D sites take the
minority and submerge into the ocean of C sites. While in the
3rd and 4th levels, interesting patterns emerge. As shown in
Fig. 3 (a), D sites form zonary shapes, surrounded by C lines.
Figure 3 (b) is for the range of 0.375 < r < 0.5. The pat-
tern shows a shape of labyrinth, and the fraction of C sites is
slightly larger than that of D sites. The pattern style can also
be explained by the stability of local patterns as that in the
4-neighbor lattice.
We have discussed the static patterns on lattices, next we
will provide a description of patterns in the case of M = 1,
where the patterns are unstable, reflected by a big oscillation
in the inset of Fig. 1 (a). Two typical patterns for M = 1 on
a 4-neighbor lattice are displayed in Fig. 4. One can see that
a large fraction of adjacent defectors (denoted by the white
area in Fig. 4 (a)) switch to cooperators together at the next
time step (denoted by the large area in black in Fig. 4 (b)),
which contributes to the big oscillation of fC . The strategy-
switch behavior of large proportional individuals can be easily
explained by noting the fact that individuals will update their
strategies by adopting the exclusive strategy in their memo-
ries (M = 1). Moreover, individuals record the strategy on
the basis of their neighbors’ strategy at the last time step. In
the strategy-switch area, individuals have identical strategies
at each time step. Therefore, at the next step, each individ-
ual should choose the anti-strategy of its neighbors to gain
more payoffs since each one only records its last step’s his-
tory. Once the drastic strategy switch occurs, it will maintain
forever.
In addition, we should briefly introduce a recent work of
Sysi-Aho et al. [7], which is correlated with the present
MBSG model. In Ref. [7], the authors proposed a spatial
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FIG. 5: (Color online). fC as a function of r in BA networks with
(a1) average degree 〈k〉 = 4 and (a2) 〈k〉 = 8 for different M . A
time series of fC for M = 1 is shown in the inset of (a2). (b1) and
(b2) are fC as a function of M in the case of 〈k〉 = 4 and 〈k〉 = 8
for a special range of r. (c1) and (c2) are average degrees 〈ks〉 of C
and D players depending on r in the case of M = 7 for 〈k〉 = 4 and
〈k〉 = 8, respectively. The network size is 10000. Each data point
is obtained by averaging over 30 different network realizations with
20 different initial state of each realization. fC for each simulation
is obtained by averaging from MC time step t = 5000 to t = 10000,
where the system has reached a steady state.
snowdrift game played by myopic agents. In such model, lat-
tices are used and each individual can adopt its current anti-
strategy at the next time according to its neighbors’ strate-
gies with a probability p. Similar spatial patterns are observed
for 8-neighbor lattices, as well as the step structure of fC de-
pending on r. However, we note that p in this model nearly
has no effect on the cooperative behavior, while in our model
the memory length M plays different roles in each coopera-
tion level. Furthermore, in the case of no memory length, i.e.,
M = 1, our model doesn’t recover the spatial snowdrift game
with myopic agents, confirmed by the big oscillation of fC in
the inset of Fig. 1 (a).
IV. MBSG ON SCALE-FREE NETWORKS
Going beyond two-dimensional lattices, we also investigate
the MBSG on scale-free (SF) networks, since such structural
property is ubiquitous in natural and social systems. Figure 5
shows the simulation results on the Baraba´si-Albert networks
[14], which are constructed by the preferential attachment
mechanism. Each data point is obtained by averaging over 30
5different network realizations with 20 different initial states of
each realization. Figures 5 (a1) and (a2) display fC depending
on r on BA networks in the cases of average degree 〈k〉 = 4
and 〈k〉 = 8 for different memory lengths M . There are some
common features in these two figures: (i) in sharp, contrast
to the cases on lattices, fC is a non-monotonous function of
r with a peak at a specific value of r. This interesting phe-
nomenon indicates that properly encouraging selfish behav-
iors can optimally enhance the cooperation on SF networks;
(ii) it is the same as the cases on lattices that the continuity of
fC is broken by some sudden decreases. The number of con-
tinuous sections corresponds to the average degree 〈k〉; (iii)
two figures have a 180◦-rotational symmetry about the point
(0.5, 0.5); (iv) the memory length M does not influence the
values of r, at which sudden decreases occur, as well as the
trend of fC , but affects the values of fC in each continuous
section. Then, we investigate the effect of M on fC in detail.
Due to the inverse symmetry of fC about point (0.5, 0.5), our
study focus on the range of 0 < r < 0.5. We found that in
both SF networks, there exists a unique continuous section, in
which M plays different roles in fC . For the case of 〈k〉 = 4,
the special range is from r = 0.34 to 0.49, as shown in Fig. 5
(a1). In this region fC as a function ofM is displayed in Fig. 5
(b1). One can find that for r = 0.42, fC is independent of M .
For 0.34 < r < 0.42, fC is a decreasing function of M ; while
for 0.42 < r < 0.49, fC becomes an increasing function of
M . Similar phenomena are observed in the SF network with
〈k〉 = 8, as exhibited in Fig. 5 (b2). r = 0.45 is the dividing
point, and for r < 0.45 and r > 0.45, fC shows decreasing
and increasing behaviors respectively as M increases. In the
case of M = 1, the system has big oscillations as shown in
the inset of Fig. 5 (a2). Similar to the cases on lattices, the
behavior of large proportion of individuals’ strategy switches
that induces the big oscillation of fC in the SF network.
In order to give an explanation for the non-monotonous be-
haviors reported in Figs. 5 (a1) and (a2), we study the average
degree 〈ks〉 of cooperators and defectors depending on r. In
Figs. 5 (c1) and (c2), 〈ks〉 of D vs r shows almost the same
trend as that of fC in Figs. 5 (a1) and (a2), also the same
sudden decreasing points at specific values of r. When r is
augmented from 0, large-degree nodes are gradually occupied
by D, reflected by the enhancement of D’s 〈ks〉. The detailed
description of the occupation of nodes with given degree can
be seen in Fig. 6. One can clearly find that on the 4-neighbor
lattice, in the case of low value of fC (Fig. 6 (a)), almost
all high degree nodes are occupied by cooperators and most
low degree nodes are occupied by defectors; while at the peak
value of fC (Fig. 6 (b)), cooperators on most high degree
nodes are replaced by defectors and on low degree nodes co-
operators take the majority. Similarly, as fC increases in the
8-neighbor lattices, defectors gradually occupy those high de-
gree nodes, together with most very low degree nodes taken
by cooperators (Fig. 6 (c) and (d)). Moreover, note that in
SF networks, large-degree nodes take the minority and most
neighbors of small-degree nodes are those large-degree ones,
so that when more and more large-degree nodes are taken by
D, more and more small-degree nodes have to choose C to
gain payoff 1 − r from each D neighbor. Thus, it is the pas-
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FIG. 6: (Color online). Distributions of strategies in BA networks.
Cooperators and defectors are denoted by gray bars and black bars,
respectively. Each bar adds up to a total fraction of 1 per degree, the
gray and black fractions being directly proportional to the relative
percentage of the respective strategy for each degree of connectivity
k. (a) is for the case of 〈k〉 = 4 with r = 0.1 and (b) is for the
case of 〈k〉 = 4 with r = 0.49, at which fC peaks. (c) shows the
case of 〈k〉 = 8 with r = 0.05 and (d) displays the case of 〈k〉 = 8
with r = 0.16, which corresponds to the maximum value of fC . All
the simulations are obtained for network size N = 1000 in order to
make figures clearly visible.
sive decision making of small-degree nodes which take the
majority in the whole populations that leads to the increase of
fC . However, for very large r, poor benefit of C results in the
reduction of fC . Therefore, fC peaks at a specific value of r
on SF networks. In addition, it is worthwhile to note that in
the case of high fC , the occupation of large degree nodes in
the MBSG on SF networks is different from recently reported
results in Ref. [15]. The authors found that all (few) high
degree nodes are occupied by cooperators, whereas defectors
only manage to survive on nodes of moderate degree. While
in our work, defectors take over almost all high degree nodes,
which induces a high level of cooperation.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have studied the memory-based snow-
drift game on networks, including lattices and scale-free net-
works. Transitions of spatial patterns are observed on lattices,
together with the step structure of the frequency of coopera-
tion versus the payoff parameter. The memory length of in-
dividuals plays different roles at each cooperation level. In
particular, non-monotonous behavior are found on SF net-
works, which can be explained by the study of the occupation
of nodes with give degree. Interestingly, in contrast to previ-
ously reported results, in the memory-based snowdrift game,
the fact of high degree nodes taken over by defectors leads to
a high cooperation level on SF networks. Furthermore, simi-
6lar to the cases on lattices, the average degrees of SF networks
is still a significant structural property for determining coop-
erative behavior. The memory effect on cooperative behavior
investigated in our work may draw some attention from scien-
tific communities in the study of evolutionary games.
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